What is the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards (CJLS) ?

The central halakhic authority of the movement is the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards (CJLS), which was founded by the Rabbinical Assembly (RA) in the 1920s. It is composed of 25 rabbis, who are voting members, and five laypeople, who do not vote, but participate fully in deliberations. When any six (or more) members vote in favor of a position, that position becomes an official position of the committee. Any particular issue can generate from one to four official positions. (When multiple positions are validated, they usually have much common ground.)

When more than one position is validated, each congregational rabbi functions as the mara de-atra (communal halakhic authority), adopting for their congregation the position he or she considers most compelling. In the overwhelming majority of cases, Conservative rabbis choose among the law committee's validated positions. On rare occasions, an individual rabbi may ignore the committee and act in accordance with his or her own convictions regarding what is halakhically correct.

CJLS decisions are not enforceable on rabbis, except regarding standards. A standard requires an 80% vote of the full membership of the CJLS and a majority vote by the plenum of the Rabbinical Assembly. Willful violations have led to resignations or expulsions from membership of the Rabbinical Assembly (RA). At present, there are four standards:

1) A complete prohibition on rabbis and cantors to officiate in any way at intermarriages.

2) A complete prohibition against officiating at the remarriage of a Jew whose previous marriage has not been halakhically terminated, whether by a halakhic divorce [get], hafka'at Kiddushin [annulment of the marriage], or death.

3) A complete prohibition against taking any action that would intimate that native Jewishness can be confirmed in any way but matrilineal descent.

4) A complete prohibition against supervising a conversion to Judaism that does not include circumcision for males, and immersion in a Mikvah for both males and females.

http://learn.jtsa.edu/topics/reading/bookexc/gillman_conservativej/chap6/part3.shtml

What principles guide Conservative Rabbis in their Halakhic decisions?

[Adapted from David Golinkin's "Halakha For Our Time"]

Conservative Jews view the laws and customs from the various law codes, such as the Mishneh Torah and Shulkhan Arukh, as the basis for binding Jewish law, and allow for law to be modified by today's halakhic authorities. While accepting the dictates of the movement's Rabbinical Assembly as normative, Conservative Jews also accept that rulings of Orthodox and Traditional rabbis are legitimate halakhic positions.

Traditional Jewish law and custom is preserved as much as possible. Changes are not made for their own sake, but rather to deal with an urgent, acute problem. A lenient ruling is usually preferable to a strict one. Judaism is a way of life and we adhere to the Talmudic saying "You shall keep my statutes and my laws which if a man shall do, he shall -live- by them, and not die because of them." [Talmud Bavli, Yoma 85b] For this reason, if the Halakha permits both a lenient and a strict ruling, the tendency is to pick the lenient ruling. This approach is firmly anchored in Jewish tradition. The Talmud clearly states that "The strength of a lenient ruling is greater" [Talmud Bavli, Berakhot, 60a]

Before giving a halakhic ruling, the subject is studied in a historic and scientific fashion to determine if the law came from the Torah, the Talmudic sages, the early rabbis (Geonim and Rishonim) or the later rabbis (Acharonim). There is generally more readiness to change a new law or something which is only a custom.

How do Conservative Jews view the various codes of Jewish law?

The Shulkhan Arukh, written in the 16th century by Rabbi Joseph Karo, and enlarged upon by Rabbi Moshe Isserles, is a standard code of Jewish law and custom. It certainly is important, but it should not be viewed as the ultimate authority, as is common among the Orthodox. It is all too often overlooked that many important halakhic authorities severely criticized those rabbis who blindly decided Jewish law according to the Shulkhan Arukh without first checking the Talmud and other major authorities. Unlike Orthodox Judaism, Conservative Judaism does not elevate any one particular recent code of law to the status of the Holy of Holies. [ Adapted from "Halakha For Our Time"]

As Solomon Schechter wrote: "But however great the literary value of a code may be, it does not invest it with infallibility, nor does it exempt it from the student or the Rabbi who makes use of it from the duty of examining each paragraph on its own merits, and subjecting it to the same rules of interpretation that were always applied to Tradition".  Solomon Schechter "Studies in Judaism", First Series p.211, London, 1896

This position is not a modern innovation. From the time of Maimonides on, rabbis have noted that binding lawcodes would violate the precept of Hilkheta Ke-Vatra'ei, the law is according to the later scholars. This rule dates from the Geonic period. It laid down that until the time of Rabbis Abbaye and Rava (4th century) the Halakha was to be decided according to the views of the earlier scholars, but from that time onward, the halakhic opinions of post-talmudic scholars would prevail over the contrary opinions of a previous generation. [See Piskei Ha'Rosh, Bava Metzia 3:10, 4:21, Shabbat 23:1].

Rabbi Asher Ben Yehiel (The Rosh) wrote:  "If one does not find their statements correct [the rulings of a previous authority] and sustain his own views with evidence that is acceptable to his contemporaries...he may contradict the earlier statements, since all matters that are not clarified in the Babylonian Talmud may be questioned and restated by any person, and even the statements of the Geonim may be differed from him...just as the statements of the Amoraim differed from the earlier ones. On the contrary, we regard the statements of later scholars to be more authoritative because they knew the reasoning of the earlier scholars as well as their own, and took it into consideration in making their decision." [Piskei Ha'Rosh, Sanhedrin 4:6, respons. Rosh 55:9] [Elon, p.55-56]

 Halakhic difference of opinion is regarded as not only legitimate, but also desirable, and indicative of the vitality of the Halakha and of the possibility of different approaches. The decisive yardstick in a halakhic dispute is only the correctness of each opinion in accordance only with the Talmud (primarily the Bavli, but also the Yerushalmi). [See Piskei ha'Rosh, Sanhedrin 4:6 and Solomon ben Yehiel Luria, Yam Shel Shelomo, intro to Bava Kamma.]

What better authority is there on the Shulkhan Arukh than Rabbis Yosef Karo and Moshe Isserles? When the R. Karo's Shulkhan Arukh came to hand, R. Isserles decided to add his own glosses to it, which he spread "like a cloth" (mappah) around R. Karo's "set table" (The Shulkhan Arukh). In his glosses he quoted different Ashkenazi opinions and customs in order to decide between them. R. Isserles explicitly disputed R. Karo's main canon, namely that Alfasi, Maimonides and the Rosh were the "pillars of halakhic decision" since this principle conflicted with the principle of Hilkheta ke-Vatra'ei (the law is in accordance with the later scholars).

Rabbi Isserles's goal was not to make a code that would constrain the decision making abilities of later rabbis. R. Isserles wrote that "the students shall not follow hereafter to drink from it without dispute" but rather that one should know of the existence of differing opinions and then decide according to the rule of Hilkheta ke-Vatra'ei and "what he sees with his own eyes". [Rama, Respon. Numbers 35 and 131]. [Elon, p.140]