Women and Jewish law

What is the Orthodox view of the role of women in Judaism?

Orthodox Judaism views men and women as having complementary roles in life. As a consequence of the different roles, men and women have different obligations (positive ways of fulfilling the will of our Creator). Jewish men, for example, have an obligation to pray at three fixed times each day. Jewish women on the other hand, don't need have this obligation. There's an important word usage to note in the above paragraph: obligation. Traditional Judaism looks at actions in terms of duties and obligations, not the modern socio-political notions of rights. Thus men and women have different duties and obligations; the question of rights never arises. [From the soc.culture.jewish FAQ, Section 8. Woman and Marriage.]

In the area of study, women were traditionally exempted - and often banned - from any study beyond a basic understanding of the Torah, and the rules necessary in running a Jewish household. Women were discouraged from learning Talmud and other advanced Jewish texts. Women are exempt from having to follow most of the set daily prayer services, and most other positive time bound mitzvot, such as wearing tefillin. (There are a number of notable exceptions). As such, the law codes specify that women are not eligible to be counted in a minyan, as a minyan is a quorum of those who are obligated. Although the Shulkhan Arukh seems to technically allow women to have aliyot, this is not done in Orthodox shuls due to the principal of Kavod HaTzibur - the honor of the congregation.

How has the traditional role of women changed?

One of the first major breaks with the traditional role of women came from within the Orthodox movement, by the Chofetz Chaim, Rabbi Yisroel Meir HaKohen (1838-1933). He overruled the traditional prohibitions against advanced training of women on the basis that times have changed, and that in the modern world it is now important for women to have an advanced Jewish education. Soon after this, the Bais Yaakov network of Orthodox Torah schools for women was built.

Recently, a few leaders in the Modern Orthodox community have set up schools that bring advanced Jewish studies to women, including Stern College at Yeshiva University, and the Drisha Institute (both in New York City). At recent conferences on Feminism and Orthodox Judaism, a small but growing number of Orthodox Jews have proposed that it may acceptable for the Orthodox movement to ordain women as rabbis. In a growing number of places, Orthodox women have established their own tefila (prayer) groups. It should be noted that this phenomenon is still an anomaly within Orthodox Judaism. Even at the flagship institution of Modern Orthodoxy, Yeshiva University, some Talmud teachers publicly denounced and forbade the concept of women praying together in a women's tefila group. Most Orthodox Jews reject the idea of ordaining women as rabbis, as they feel that this is an unacceptable deviation from tradition.  For more information, see the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance website at:

http://www.jofa.org/

Can women receive Aliyot?

In 1955 the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards (CJLS) of the Rabbinical Assembly (RA) issued a responsum permitting synagogues to give aliyot to women. This was based on a teshuva by Rabbi Aaron Blumenthal, which includes these points:

The essential rule is based on Talmud Bavli, Megillah 23a "Anyone may ascend for the seven honors [of reading the Torah in public], even a minor, even a woman, but the sages have said that a woman shall not read in public because of K'vod hatzibur [dignity of the congregation]. This rule is repeated in the Tur and the Shulkhan Arukh. However, an earlier version is found in the Tosefta, where it says: "Anyone may ascend for the seven honors, even a minor, even a woman"; then it says "One may not _bring_ a woman to read in public. According to Prof. Saul Lieberman this meant that women in the congregation were allowed to read the Torah; however, it was considered wrong to bring in a woman from the outside to read the Torah. It would reflect on the honor of a congregation if they had no man who can read from the Torah. Some Palestinian synagogues resorted to inviting a woman for this purpose; The b'raita reflects the Babylonian practice which rejected this custom. Thus, this concern is not releveant today when all synagogues have members (of both sexes) capable of reading the Torah scroll.

There is halakhic precedent for this which has all too often been overlooked: Rabbi Jacob Emden (18th cent.) wrote "It seems to me that a woman may not read the in public wherever this is possible. But the first sentence (granting her permission) would apply when there are not seven men (among the ten who constitute a minyan) who can read, and there is a woman who can read, that they cannot do without her." The Ran (14th cent. Toledo) commenting upon the Alfas on Megillah 23a. notes that "All may ascend ...for the seven honors; This means to complete the number of seven but not that -all- may be minors or women." Thus, women may read the Torah, but some aliyot have to be reserved for men! Rabbi Akiba Eger (18/19th cent. Posen), commenting on the B'er Hetev (R. Judah ben Simon Ashkenazi) writes that women may ascend for an aliyah on Shabbat or the festivals.

In 1975, the chairman of the CJLS wrote that congregations that do not count women to the minyan may nevertheless call women to the Torah, as the two issues are distinct.

Can women count in a minyan?

Subject: Can women count in a minyan? (a quorum of 10 adult Jews necessary for a public prayer service to be held),

There are three views that are held in the Conservative movement on this issue.

(I) The first is the customary traditional position, which does not count women for the minyan. This position is accepted by approximately 20% of North American Conservative synagogues, very few in Israel, and by many of the Masorti synagogues in the United Kingdom.

(II) The second position is the most liberal one, and was adopted in 1973. The law committee chose to issue a takkanah (legislative enactment) rather than adopt a specific teshuva (responsa). The takkanah was based on a teshuva prepared by Rabbi Phillip Segal. [See "Conservative Judaism and Jewish Law", p.281-292.]

In 1993 JTS Talmud Processor Judith Hauptman authored a set of papers on this subject and related issues. Her work supports this line of reasoning. See _Judaism_ Winter 1993 v.42(1) p.94 "Women and prayer"; and _Judaism_ Fall 1993 v42(4) "Some thoughts on the nature of halakhic adjudication". Her papers are summarized below. Her thesis is that halakha demands that all adult Jewish women count in a minyan because:

(a) Women do have the same obligation to say tefila, including not only the Amidah but many other papers. The Mishnah says that women are obligated to say tefilah. Rashi and Tosafot hold that prayer is rabbinically ordained, and that the tefila that the Mishnan obligates men to recite is the same as that which are required to recite; both must recite it with the same frequency. Other prominent authorities who rules in this was are R. Isaac Alfasi and Maimonides (11th century), R. Joseph Karo (16th century), R. Yehiel Epstein (19th century) author of Arukh HaShulhan, and R. Meir Hakohen (more popularly known as the Hafetz Hayyim), (20th century). In fact, the Hafetz Hayyim obligates women not only to tefila, but to virtually all of the components of morning and afternoon prayer.

(b) Men are encouraged to pray with a minyan, but contrary to popular misunderstanding, this is not a halakhic requirement. The Shulkhan Arukh OH 90:9 says "A person should make every effort to attend services in a synagogue with a quorum; if circumstances prevent him from doing so, he should pray, wherever he is, at the same time that the synagogue service takes place". As Prof. Hauptman points out "every effort" is not synonymous with absolute obligation. Communal prayer is a preferred option, but it is not a requirement. It is therefore incorrect to conclude that to serve as a prayer leader it is necessary to have an obligation to pray in a minyan, and since women do not have such an obligation, they cannot serve as prayer leader. No Jew, according to Karo, has an obligation to public prayer.

(c) The Mishna and Talmud nowhere exclude women from participating in the modern day form of minyan. In fact, "in all four cases where the Talmud or its commentators allude to gender and minyan, opportunities for minyan participation are extended to women" [Hauptman]. In _Judaism_ Fall 1993 v42(4) Prof. Hauptman writes:

R. Joshua b. Levi (BT Megillah 4a) obligates women to read or hear a reading of the megillah, just like men, it follows, according to some authorities, that women may count in the minyan for reading the megillah, and even read it for men. The Mishnah (Megillah 4:3, Megillah 23b) states that no fewer than ten must gather to read the Torah in public. A tannaitic source [cited on that page]...says that women may be called to read from the Torah in public, and that, in fact, everyone, even a child, is qualified to read. Can there by any doubt, in these circumstances, that women count in the required minyan?  According to some authorities, women's obligation to recite Grace is Biblical, and a woman can therefore recite Grace for a man.  It would also seem to follow that she could then count in the quorum of three for zimmun and the quorum of ten for zimmun in God's name. In fact, R. Judah hacohen (Mainz, c. 1050) and other authorities rule that a woman may count in a men's zimmun. If a Jew is asked to violate a commandment of Torah in a public setting, or else die, he must choose death. A public setting is defined as the presence of a minyan of ten Jews (asarah b'nei adam). According to some recent authorities, women are counted in the minyan for kiddush hashem because they, like men, are obligated by this mizvah. Again, the principle at work here is that people who are similarly obligated join together to form a minyan....the general defining quality of those who count in a minyan is obligation, unless explicitly stated to the contrary. Since women are obligated to read the megillah, die for kiddush hashem, recite Grace, and theoretically are qualified to read the Torah in public, just like men, and may therefore count in  the minyan for these mizvot, and since, as I demonstrated in my previous article, women are obligated to pray at least twice daily, just like men, it follows that they may count in the minyan for prayer.

(d) Contrary to the common misperceptions, Jewish law never formally prevented women from counting in a minyan until R. Karo stated this in his Shulkhan Arukh (1600s). However, this R. Karo expands on this in his larger work, the Beit Yosef (of which the Shulkha Arukh is only a student's abridgement!); in the latter work he notes that there are legitimate views that women indeed may be able to count in a minyan, and that his rejecting this position is only one view.

(III) The third Conservative view is stricter than the view held by Segal and Hauptman, but more liberal than the position within Orthodoxy. In 1983 the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary voted to accept women into the rabbinical school. One of the conditions for this was for women to be able to count in a minyan and have the same halakhic obligations as those of men. While many accepted the Segal paper, some had questions about the propriety of this approach. A responsum was prepared by Rabbi Joel Roth that bypassed all such concerns. His responsum showed that it was possible for women to make a vow which would obligate themselves to follow these mitzvot; their new status is halakhically considered to have the same level of obligation as that of men. This was the position officially accepted by JTS. In this view, women generally may not count in a minyan, unless they have specifically taken a vow to obligate themselves in regards to these mitzvot. Any women who wants to count in a minyan thus can; those that do not want to be counted are free not to undertake any such obligations. In his teshuva (published in "The Ordination of Women as Rabbis) he states:

"To be sure, it must be made absolutely clear to all women who adopt the observance of mitzvot that there is often more involved than observance alone. This is particularly true either where a minyan is needed of where the issue of agency is involved. They must understand that only obligated individuals constitute a quorum and only one who is obligated can serve as an agent for others. Just because a woman comes to services, or dons tallit and tefillin, or receives an aliyah does not mean she has the right to be counted toward a minyan or to act as an agent in behalf of one who is obligated to perform a mitzvah.... women may be counted in a minyan or serve as a shatz (shaliach tzibur, cantor) only when they have accepted upon themselves the voluntary obligation to pray as required by the law, and at the times required by the law, and only when they recognize and affirm that failure to comply with the obligation is sin. Then they may be counted in the quorum and serve as the agents for others."

Can women serve as witnesses (edut)?

Adapted from "The Dynamics of Judaism" and Mayer Rabinowitz's paper in "On the Ordination of Women as Rabbis"

According to the Talmud, women are ineligible to serve as witnesses (edut). This is derived from two places in Deuteronomy: 19:15, which deals with witnesses, but does not specify gender, and 19:17, which indicates the male gender, but is concerned with litigants, not witnesses. However Conservative rabbis understand that the presence of Biblical quotes in a Talmudic proof does not always constitute proof that the injunction is biblical; It is often an attempt to associate some existing practice with the Bible in order to give the practice authority.

Maimonides rejected the Talmud's logic in this case, and instead offered a different reason as to why women should not be allowed to serve as witnesses. He bases the prohibition on Deut. 17:16, which describes witnesses with the word 'edhim', which is masculine. Thus the Rambam rules that all witnesses must be male. However the Kesef Mishneh rejects this proof, as the Torah generally uses masculine plural verbs when it wishes to include both men and women. The Shulkhan Arukh simply states that a women may not be witnesses, and does not claim that this is a biblical law. Thus, although the prohibition is time honored, its origin is unclear, and some believe that the reasons for enforcing it are not valid. Moreover, the rabbis did decide to permit women to serve as witnesses in some cases. See Talmud Bavli, Tractate Rosh HaShanah, 22a; Torah Temimah, Devarim 19:15, note 44; and Encyclopedia Judaica Vol. 16, p.586 for a number of such cases.

The areas from which women were excluded from testifying were those in which they were not knowledgeable or reliable due to lack of experience or interest. In today's world, where women have the same education as men, this is no longer the case. Therefore, these considerations persuaded six members of the CJLS to vote to reclassify the status of women vis-a-vis edut based on the realities of our era. This became an official position of the CJLS in 1974. (Aaron Blumenthal, "The Status of Women in Jewish Law", Conservative Judaism, 31:3 (Spring 1977), pp.24-40.

This view was given further halakhic support by in 1983 by Rabbi Joel Roth. He writes that allowing women to be become witnesses can be done by the traditional halakhic concept of shinui ha'itim (times have changed). "It is simply inconceivable to me that anyone could cogently argue that modern women are generally unreliable as witnesses, that the entire class of women should be disqualified...I recommend therefore, the exercise by the faculty of the ultimate systematic right of the learned who are committed to Halachah to openly and knowingly abrogate the prohibition against women serving as witnesses. This is the ultimate Halachically warranted act. It is not a non-Halachic act" ("The Ordination of Women as Rabbis", p.171)

In practice most Conservative rabbis, including Rabbi Roth, currently affirm this only as a theoretical opinion, because an overriding concern of Conservative Judaism is Jewish unity. This change could result in most Orthodox Jews refusing to recognize the legitimacy of many Conservative marriages and divorces, and could lead to many children (unfairly) being tagged as mamzerim (illegitimate).

In recent decades the Reform movement has moved further to the left (no kosher witnesses required, no ketubot at marriage, no gittin at divorces) and the Orthodox movement has moved further to the right (denying the legitimacy of all non-Orthodox rabbis and witnesses, denying the legitimacy of all non-Orthodox marriages, etc.) In response, the Conservative movement is attempting to maintain Jewish unity. One Conservative solution in this area is to use Ketubot (the wedding document) with spaces for four witnesses to sign: Two men, and two women. This satifies all halakhic requirements.

How can women be ordained as rabbis within Jewish law?

Taken largely from Robert Gordis's "The Dynamics of Judaism"

Rabbi Gordis writes "Reform Judaism rejects the authority of halakha, and as such Reform rabbis simply began ordaining women as rabbis when the demand for it increased. No attempt was made to bring this about through a normative, halakhic mechanism. Orthodox Judaism thus far has had no serious problem in this area since it rejects the idea completely. Orthodox dogma maintains that halakha is an immutable manifestation of Divine Will. Thus, since women have not been rabbis in the past, they should not be rabbis in the future. Rabbinic texts are then searched for sources from which a prohibition of women's ordination can be extracted to back up this claim."

In contrast, the ordination of women rabbis has only been an issue for Conservative Judaism. In 1977 Chancellor Gerson D. Cohen assigned a commission to study the feasibility of women rabbis. The majority report, presented to the RA in 1979, recommended the admission of women to the rabbinical course. They declared that "There is no direct Halakhic objection to the acts of training and ordaining a woman to be a rabbi, preacher, and teacher in Israel." At that time, most of the seminary's Talmud faculty, and much of the rabbinate and laity was still against this change, so the idea was tabled for a number of years. Finally, in 1983, after more study, the faculty of JTS voted to admit women to the seminary. In the course of their study, the committee examined the traditional arguments against granting women smicha. Most notable was the fact that there is simply no law prohibiting women from becoming rabbis. However, opponents of women's ordination have deduced that it is illegal to do so from a number of arguments:

(1) The Mishna says that "Everyone is eligible to slaughter an animal, except a deaf-mute, an insane person, or a minor". This statement has always been taken to mean that a women is legally allowed to be a shochet (ritual slaughterer). One argument proposed by opponents of women's ordination was that since the Talmud is telling us that women can be shochtim, they can not be rabbis, because if they could, the Talmud would have said so in a similar fashion. This line of reasoning was rejected.

(2) Many rabbis declared that the halakha is opposed to women's ordination on the basis of a Talmudic quote from Tractate Sotah, 20a. Here, Rabbi Eliezer claims that it is obscene to teach a woman Torah. However, this is only the opinion of one sage, and this view is contradicted in the same paragraph by Ben Azzai, who says "A man is required to teach Torah to his daughter". In fact Rabbi Eliezer's highly conservative views were overruled time and time again by his colleagues. It was seen as disingenuous to use this as a reason to deny women smicha; Orthodox Jews themselves do not follow this rule: Both black hat and Centrist Orthodox Jews teach their daughters Torah as well as Mishna and Midrash, and to some extent, Talmud.

(3) Deut. 23:20 notes that Israel may choose a King; Commenting on this, Midrash Sifre Shofetim sec. 157 says that the Torah means to say "A king [only] and not a queen." Maimonides, in his Mishneh Torah, legislated this midrash as halakha, and broadened this to mean that women may not have any position of great authority in Jewish life. However, this ruling contradicts actual Jewish practice: Pharisaic Judaism (the forerunners of Rabbinic Jews) accepted Shelom-Zion (Salome Alexandra) as the legitimate Queen during the Second Temple period. Indeed, her commitment to Jewish law is praised in the Talmud and midrash. Similarly in the first century CE Queen Helene was praised for her piety and philanthropy, and no word of censure was raised against her rule. Today, most of Orthodox Judaism allows women to become respected Bible scholars, Talmud scholars, elected holders of public office, and the presidents of synagogues. Denying them the rabbinate is seen as hypocritical.

(4) The strongest argument against the ordination of women is that halakha exempts them from the obligation of prayer. This exemption is buttressed by the Talmudic principle that women are free from observing positive time bound commandments. However, Robert Gordis points out that the Talmud's decision to exempt women from most positive time bound commandments was in fact a generalization from a few specific instances, and not a universally binding rule (p.52, Greenberg). In our case, the rule in clearly descriptive and not prescriptive, as the many exceptions make clear. There are many rituals performed at set times that women are obligated to follow, such as kindling Sabbath lights, hearing the reading of the megillah on Purim, counting the omer, making kiddush, fasting, eating matzoh, rejoicing on festivals, eating the Paschal lamb, drinking the four cups of wine at the seder, and lighting Chanukah candles.

Here is a Conservative responsa on "May Women Wear Tefillin ?"

http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/cjmag/97fa/womtef.html

(5) The last major argument is that since women are not obligated in all the same ways that men are, they are thus not qualified to be a shaliach tzibur (emissary of the congregation). However this line of reasoning was not considered to be an obstacle for four separate reasons, each of which alone is sufficient to override this objection.

a) In practice, the rabbi isn't usually the shaliach tzibur. It is usually the hazzan (cantor), or a lay person who leads the prayers.

b) According to the halakha, the shaliach tzibur conducts the services to help fulfill the obligations of worshippers who cannot pray for themselves. This provision stems from a time before the invention of the printing press when prayer books were scarce and many Jews could not pray on their own. In contrast, in modern times prayer books with translations are available at all synagogues.

c) Women may voluntarily decide to take on these obligations. See the position held by R. Roth in the above section "Can women count in a minyan?"

(d) "The clearest statement in the Mishnah on a person's eligibility to perform a ritual act for another appears at the end of Rosh Hashanah 3:8: 'A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor may not discharge the obligations of others. This is the general principle: whoever is not obligated to perform a certain act, may not perform this act on behalf of others.' It is obvious that the second statement provides the rationale for the first: some people may not be designated as shofar-blowers for the congregation because they themselves are not obligated to fulfill this mizvah. A similar statement appears in Megillah 23a in the context of a discussion about reading the Torah in public. A tannaitic source states that women, in theory, could count in the seven aliyot on Shabbat, meaning that they are eligible to read from the Torah, but, because of the 'dignity of the congregation'...they are not called to do so. That is, women as women may be called to read from the Torah on Shabbat. But, in a society where their social standing makes them subordinate to, and dependent upon, men, and, hence, of lesser dignity, women may not." Thus in a society such as ours this concern is not applicable; In fact in most synagogues it would offend the dignity of the congrehation if a women were unable to act as a shalich tzibur. ["Women and prayer" Judith Hauptman Judaism Winter 1993 v42 n1 p.94]

What is the status of women as Kohanim and Leviyim?

(1) May a Bat Kohen and Bat Levi be called up for the first two Aliyot?

One position of the CJLS is that daughters of Kohanim and Leviym can be accorded the same aliyot that are normally accorded to Kohanim and Leviyim, whether they are single or married. Their status regarding being called to the Torah should not be determined by the lineage of their husbands, but by their own paternal lineage. [Rabbi Joel Roth "The status of daughters of Kohanim and Leviyim for aliyot" 11/15/89] Another position the CJLS is that women do not receive such aliyot. The Va'ad Halakha of the Masorti movement has also ruled that women do not receive such aliyot. [Rabbi Robert Harris, 5748].

(2) Women performing Pidyon haben

There is precedent, though not with unanimity, in the halakhah for a Bat Kohen to serve equally with other Kohanim with respect to Pidyon ha-Ben. There is strong opinion in the Talmud supported by later authorities that she may receive some of the priestly dues designated for Kohanim. Even when married to a non-Kohen, she does not become a zarah like her husband, but retains certain kehuna privileges. Women may thus perform Pidyon ha-Ben. [Rabbi Aaron Blumenthal, 1977]. Rabbi Joel Roth notes that Rishonim (rabbis from the 10th to 16th centuries) are divided on this issue, and cautions that this issue requires more detailed study. [1989]

(3) Prohibition of performing Pidyon ha-bat on a newborn daughter.

Pidyon Ha-Bat is a newly proposed ceremony that would mark the redemption of a newborn daughter; the CJLS has stated that this particular ceremony should not be performed. Other means, such as a Simchat Bat, should instead be used to mark the special status of a new born daughter. [CJLS teshuvah by Rabbi Gerald C. Skolnik, 1993]

(4) Nesiat Kapayim [The Priestly Blessing]: The CJLS has approved two positions on whether women may participate in Nesiat Kapayim. The Va'ad Halakha of the Masorti movement has approved one position.

(i) A Bat Kohen may participate in Nesiat Kapayim because: (a) The word "banav" in Numbers 66:23 does not mean sons only, but rather children. (b) The role of the Kohen is either to serve as the medium for God's blessing to israel, or to pray for Israel to be blessed - either purpose is appropriate for a Bat Kohen who possesses lineal sanctity. (c) Nesiat Kapayim is not de'oreita. (d) There has been a steady development of this ritual since Temple times, and there is no reason for the development to stop. (e) A Bat Kohen is permitted to receive other special honors accorded to Kohanim, including Birkat Hamazon and Pidyon Haben. [Rabbi Mayer Rabinowitz, 1994]

(ii) A Bat Kohen is not permitted to participate in Nesiat Kapayim because as a continuation of a Temple ritual, the Priestly Benediction should be performed by those who were authentically eligible to do so in the Temple. Women of Priestly descent may benefit from the perquisities of Kehunah, but they are excluded by the Torah from peforming the rituals of the Kohanim in the Temple. Therefore, this should only be peformed by male Kohanim. [Rabbis Stanley Bramnick and Judah Kagen, 1994]. The Va'ad halakha of the Masorti movement, in a teshuvah by Rabbi Reuven Hammer, 5748, also states this position.